Representational effects in a rule discovery task by Vallee-Tourangeau, Frederic et al.
Representational Effects in a Rule Discovery Task 
 
Frédéric Vallée-Tourangeau, Andrea Krüsi Penney and Teresa Payton 
Psychology Research Unit, Kingston University 
Kingston-upon-Thames, UNITED KINGDOM  KT1 2EE 





In the Wason (1960) rule discovery task reasoners must infer 
a rule that governs the production of number sequences. The 
task instructions are designed such that reasoners’ initial 
hypotheses are invariantly narrower than the correct rule. The 
inferential challenge lies in discovering the scope of these 
initial hypotheses. The traditional task departs from real-
world hypothesis testing in at least one significant respect: 
The task is never presented in a manner that offers a rich 
external representation of the problem. The study reported 
here examined representational effects by developing task 
isomorphs which offered either an external, physically 
manipulable, representation of the problem space or a 
graphical presentation of the simple linear relationships 
between adjacent numbers in a sequence. Compared to a 
control condition, these task isomorphs lead to a significantly 
higher incidence of successful rule discovery, and encouraged 
the creation of a significantly more heterogeneous set of 
number sequences. Further, control participants had to 
produce 50% more number sequences than participants who 
worked with a rich external representation before discovering 
the rule. 
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Introduction 
Wason (1960) created a simple inductive inference context 
which cast light on reasoners’ ability to discard plausible but 
overly narrow hypotheses. Wason’s 2-4-6 task consists of 
discovering the rule that governs the production of 
sequences of three numbers, or triples. To do so, 
participants create new number sequences that are then 
classified as either conforming or not to the rule. In Wason’s 
original task the rule is ‘any increasing sequence’. Before 
formulating their first test triple, participants are given the 
following crucial but misleading piece of information: the 
triple 2-4-6 conforms to the rule. This information implicitly 
identifies a set of triples that is narrower and more 
structured than the set of all conforming triples (Klayman & 
Ha, 1987). The salient features of the 2-4-6 example, 
namely evens and constant increments, constrain the initial 
hypotheses formulated by reasoners just as Wason (1960) 
intended. New sequences motivated by such initial 
hypotheses (e.g., 8-10-12) will unfailingly receive positive 
feedback since they are predicated on features that are 
sufficient but not necessary to produce triples that receive 
positive feedback. The challenge in this task thus lies in 
discovering the boundaries of such initially plausible 
hypotheses by formulating sequences that fall outside their 
scope, such as 1-19-33 for example.  
Solving the 2-4-6 task is hard. In Wason’s (1960) original 
study, 80% of participants failed to announce the correct 
rule at their first attempt. Subsequent replications have 
reported similarly low rates of success (e.g., Mahoney & 
DeMonbreun, 1977; Tweney, Doherty, Worner, Pliske, 
Mynatt, Gross, & Arkkelin, 1980; Wason, 1968). Two 
features characterise the hypothesis-testing output of most 
participants: indolence and narrow-mindedness (Vallée-
Tourangeau, Austin, & Rankin, 1995). That is, participants 
produce few triples before announcing their best guess and 
those triples form a very homogenous set, which includes 
relatively few triples that increase by variable increments or 
that receive negative feedback. This rather grim reasoning 
profile has been consecrated into textbook wisdom (e.g., 
Poletiek, 2001; Schustack, 1988; Sutherland, 1992).  
Two research avenues can be explored in an attempt to 
shed light on the poor rule-discovery performance in the 2-
4-6 task. The first focuses on properties internal to the 
reasoners (cf. Stanovich & West, 2000). Wason himself 
enjoined future researchers to identify reasoners with a 
‘disposition to refute’ (1960, p. 139). Vartanian, Martindale, 
and Kwiatkowski (2003) suggested that individual 
differences in creativity predicted successful rule induction 
in the 2-4-6 task. The second focuses on properties of the 
external environment. The aim is to determine whether 
variations in the physical presentation of the task encourage 
different degrees of diligence and creativity, and hence 
result in different degrees of success (Duncan, 1998). The 
research reported here stems from this latter perspective. 
Representational Effects 
Despite the simplicity of the 2-4-6 task, the inferential 
challenge of identifying the scope of a hypothesis and 
establishing its generalizability mirror features of real-world 
hypothesis-testing (Gorman, 1995). However, unlike real-
world hypothesis testing the external representation of the 
dimensions of the triple space and the actual number 
sequences is nonexistent or impoverished. Rule discovery 
behaviour proceeds primarily on the basis of the reasoner’s 
internal representation of the problem. The extent to which 
the representation of the problem is distributed between the 
reasoner’s mind and the environment is limited to the 
written record of triples tested and feedback received. In this 
important respect the inferential context of the original 
Wason task is relatively atypical of real-world hypothesis 
testing. Scientific hypothesis testing, for example, is a 
process shaped by artefacts and methodologies favoured by 
researchers that encourage and constrain the nature of the 
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Figure 1:  Eight-sided die.
hypotheses formulated and tested. Results of the scientific 
tests are also analysed and illustrated through a choice of 
representational media (e.g., a particular graphic format or 
diagram) that facilitates interpretation and best stimulates 
the formulation of new hypotheses (cf. Cheng, 1996). Thus, 
real-world hypothesis testing often proceeds from a much 
richer representation of the problem. The representation 
through which the problem is investigated and analysed is 
distributed over the reasoner’s mental representation of the 
problem and its external representation structured by 
artefacts, cognitive or otherwise.  
The work of Norman (1993) and Zhang (1997; Zhang & 
Norman, 1994) among others has clearly demonstrated that 
the manner with which a problem is externally represented 
shapes the cognitive strategies reasoners employ to solve it 
and hence their success at doing so. For example, Zhang 
(1997) looked at problem-solving behavior in the ‘game of 
fifteen’, a problem isomorphic to tic-tac-toe, where two 
players take turn selecting integers from 0 to 9 with the goal 
of being first to select three that sum to 15 (Simon, 1996, 
Ch. 5). While traditional tic-tac-toe offers a rich external 
representation of the problem, the game of fifteen proceeds 
primarily from an internal representation. As a result it 
fosters a much poorer and slower appreciation of the 
strategic imperatives for a draw than traditional tic-tac-toe. 
Such representational effects illustrate that problems 
isomorphic at some level of description may vary 
significantly in terms of the richness of the information 
embedded in their physical presentation. This variance can 
lead to significant differences in comprehension and 
problem-solving strategies. 
Recently, Vallée-Tourangeau and Krüsi Penney (in press) 
investigated representational effects in the 2-4-6 task by 
offering a physically manipulable representation of the 
dimensions of the triple space. In a first experiment these 
dimensions were presented as three traditional 6-sided dice. 
The triple space in this task isomorph was thus defined in 
terms of 63 (or 216) triples composed of number sequences 
made up exclusively of positive integers ranging from 1 to 
6. The substantial reduction in the size of the triple space 
might in itself have facilitated rule discovery. However, this 
did not appear to be the case. In the 1-6 control condition of 
Vallée-Tourangeau and Krüsi Penney’s first experiment, 
21% (4 out of 19) of participants announced the correct rule 
under such circumstances, compared to 20% in Wason 
(1960). Further, the hypothesis-testing profile of these 
participants gauged in terms of number of triples tested and 
their homogeneity was indistinguishable from the profile of 
the participants in Wason (1960). In contrast, participants in 
the Dice isomorph tested more triples of a more varied kind, 
including more nonincreasing triples, than in the 1-6 
condition, and 66% (27 out of 41) announced the correct 
rule.  
An external representation of the dimensions of the triple 
space made the number permutations perceptually salient 
seeding the triple generation process. Additionally, 
participants could physically manipulate these dimensions 
by rotating the dice and could produce new triples by 
moving the position of the dice. Alternatively, it could be 
argued that the familiarity of the dice as random number 
generating devices and their association with games of 
chance might have primed reasoners to think of the 2-4-6 
task in fundamentally different terms (cf. Vanderhenst, 
Rossi, & Schroyens, 2002). However in Vallée-Tourangeau 
and Krüsi Penney’s (in press) second experiment, reasoners 
generated triples using three sets of six hexagonal chips, 
each chip showing a circular array of open circles. A 
number from 1 to 6 was represented by having a 
corresponding number of shaded circles. None of the 
resulting patterns of dots matched the familiar patterns on 
any of the six sides of a traditional die. As with the Dice 
isomorph, participants working on the 2-4-6 task with the 
hexagonal chips tested a more heterogeneous set of triples 
and were significantly more likely to discover the rule than 
participants engaged in the traditional version of the task.  
The research reported here extended the investigation of 
representational effects in the 2-4-6 task. In the current 
study, a larger triple space was employed by increasing the 
number range to 1-8 defining a triple space composed of 
512 possible triples. In a first experimental condition, 8-
sided role playing dice were employed to represent the 
dimensions of the triple space (see Fig. 1). Unlike with 
traditional 6-sided dice, each number on these 8-sided dice 
was represented by a digit and not by a configuration of 
dots.  
In a second experimental condition, participants were 
asked to generate a triple, plot the three numbers on a 
simple grid and then draw a line connecting the points. On 
this grid the x axis coded the position of the three numbers 
in the sequence (first, second, third) and the y axis 
represented the dimension of the triple space, namely 1 to 8. 
Figure 2 illustrates how triple 2-4-6 would be represented on 
such a grid. In this manner, participants created a graphical 
representation of the pattern inherent in the number 
sequence. Such a graph visually exposed the linear 
relationship between adjacent numbers, thus eliminating the 
computational cost of inferring such a pattern from a 
numerical representation alone, a concept Scaife and Rogers 
(1996) refer to as computational offloading. A graphical 
representation conveys the slope inherent to triples that 
receive positive and negative feedback, as well as its 
acceleration. For example, a positively accelerating curve 
for triple 1-2-8 or a negatively accelerating curve for triple 
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Figure 2: Plotted triples. The left-panel ('2-4-6' triple) was shown to the participants as part of the task 
instructions in the Graph  condition.
1-7-8 (see Fig. 2). The inferential task in the Graph 
condition is thus isomorphic to the one in the control 
condition (and in the Dice condition). However, the Graph 
condition offers a perceptually compelling representation of 
the simple linear relationship between the consecutive 
numbers that compose a given triple. Such a representation 
may also direct the kinds of hypotheses formulated to 
describe such simple incremental patterns. In other words, 
examining plotted triples may ‘limit abstractions’ (Stenning 
& Oberlander, 1995). 
Both the Dice and the Graph conditions enrich the 
distributed representation underpinning the hypothesis-
testing process. In the Dice condition, the representation in 
enriched by the fact that reasoners can physically 
manipulate the three dimensions of the triple space in 
creating and selecting triples to test. In the Graph condition, 
the external representation created by plotting the triple 
affords ‘perceptual inferences’ (Larkin & Simon, 1987) that 
might facilitate the rule-discovery process.  
Method 
Design & Procedure 
Participants were assigned, on a random basis to either the 
control condition or one of the two enriched representation 
conditions, Dice or Graph. Participants in all three 
conditions were tested individually in a quiet room. In the 
control condition, participants engaged in the 2-4-6 task in 
the absence of an enriched external representation. In the 
testing room participants sat down at a desk on which was 
placed an answer sheet headed with a paragraph of 
instructions followed by a table with two columns labelled 
Number sequence and Feedback and 18 unnumbered rows. 
On the first row the triple 2-4-6  and  YES were printed in 
their respective column. The instructions read: 
The present task consists in discovering why certain numbers 
go together in a sequence. To start you off, I can tell you that 
2-4-6 is a sequence that satisfies the rule I have in mind. In 
order to discover my rule, you should produce new sequences 
and for each sequence you produce I will tell you whether or 
nor it fits the pattern I am looking for. Number sequences can 
only be made up from numbers 1 to 8. You can produce as 
many or as few sequences as you wish, but proceed to tell me 
your best guess only when you feel highly confident that you 
have discovered the rule that I have in mind. 
Participants wrote number sequences on the answer sheet 
and the experimenter entered the feedback in the adjacent 
column. Participants were not asked to formulate a 
hypothesis before the production of any triple nor offer any 
justification. When participants announced they were 
sufficiently confident to stop producing new triples and state 
their hypothesis they wrote their answer at the bottom of the 
answer sheet. The task ended after participants wrote down 
their answer; they did not continue with the task if they 
announced an incorrect hypothesis. 
In the Dice isomorph participants sat a desk on which was 
placed three 8-sided dice and the same answer sheet. The 
dice displayed the numbers 2, 4, and 6, in ascending order. 
Instructions were the same as in the control condition but 
for the third sentence that read: 
In order to discover my rule, you should produce new 
sequences using the three dice, each dice corresponding to 
one of the numbers in the sequence, and for each sequence 
you produce I will tell you whether or nor it fits the pattern I 
am looking for. 
Participants generated new number sequences by 
manipulating the dice; they were not allowed to throw the 
dice to generate a triple. The experimenter transcribed each 
new triple on the answer sheet and provided feedback.  
In the Graph condition instructions were on a separate 
sheet. They informed participants how to plot their triples 
on a small paper grid (4.5 cm by 6.5 cm) where the x axis 
was labelled 1st, 2nd, and 3rd and the y axis ranged from 1 to 
8. The instructions were the same as in the control condition 
except for the following modifications: 
In order to discover my rule, you should produce new 
sequences of three numbers. The new sequences can only be 
made up using numbers from 1 to 8. Once you have produced 
a new sequence, and before I tell you whether or not it fits the 
pattern I am looking for, I would like you to draw the number 
sequence on a grid, as illustrated below.  
The grid shown to the subject was the triple 2-4-6 plotted as 
in the left panel of Figure 2. Instructions as to when to stop 
producing new sequences and announce a rule were the 
same as in the Control and Dice condition. The instructions 
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N n % Mean s.e. Mean s.e. Mean s.e. Mean s.e. Mean s.e.
Dice 30 16 53% 6.77 0.58 5.07 0.46 1.70 0.23 22.55% 3.00% 0.58 0.05
Graph 30 15 50% 6.47 0.73 4.23 0.40 2.23 0.53 28.33% 4.00% 0.52 0.05
COMBINED 60 31 52% 6.61 0.47 4.65 0.31 1.97 0.28 26.87% 2.79% 0.55 0.04
CONTROL 61 19 31% 7.02 0.68 5.43 0.50 1.57 0.27 17.59% 2.33% 0.66 0.04
Correct Triples Homogeneity RatioPercent NegativeNegative TriplesPositive Triples
TABLE 1: Rule discovery performance in the Dice and Graph conditions (separate and combined) and in the control condition in 
terms of number of participants who announced the correct rule (and in percent),  mean number of trials before announcements, 
mean number of triples that received positive and negative feedback, mean percentage of triples that received negative feedback, 
and mean homogeneity ratio (s.e. = standard error)
next summed up the three-step procedure: (1) produce new 
sequence, (2) draw sequence on grid, (3) receive feedback. 
Plotted triples remained in full view of the participants as 
they produced new triples.  
Measures 
Performance in all three conditions was measured along six 
dimensions: (1) the proportion of participants who 
announced the correct increasing sequence rule; (2) the 
number of triples tested before announcing the rule; (3) the 
number of increasing or positive triples; (4) the number of 
nonincreasing or negative triples; (5) the proportion of 
tested triples that received negative feedback; (6) the 
homogeneity of the set of triples produced as gauged by the 
ratio of triples generated that increased by constant 
increments over all triples tested. If a, b, and c represent the 
first, second and third number in a triple, a constant 
increment triple is one where (b – a) = (c – b). The higher 
this ratio, the narrower and more homogeneous the set of 
triples produced before announcing a rule. 
Participants 
One hundred and twenty one undergraduate students at 
Kingston University were recruited to participate in this 
study. Sixty one were assigned to the control group and 60 
were assigned to one of two experimental conditions, 30 in 
the Dice isomorph and 30 in the Graph condition.  
Results 
Sixteen participants (or 53%) and 15 participants (or 50%) 
in the Dice and in the Graph conditions, respectively, 
announced the correct ‘increasing sequence’ rule. In 
contrast, 19 out of 61 (or 31%) announced the correct rule in 
the control condition. A chi-square analysis revealed that 
significantly more participants announced the correct rule in  
the experimental conditions (31 out 60) than in the control 
condition (19 out of 61), χ2 (1) = 5.25 (a .05 rejection 
criterion was employed unless indicated otherwise). 
 Performance in the Dice and in the Graph conditions did 
not significantly differ along any of the six dimensions 
reported in Table 1, that is in terms of success rate (53% vs. 
50%), triples tested before announcing the rule (6.77 vs. 
6.47), number of triples that received positive (5.07 vs. 
4.23) and negative (1.70 vs. 2.23) feedback, percentage of 
triples that received negative feedback (22.6% vs. 28.3%) 
and homogeneity ratio (0.58 vs. 0.52). In light of these 
results, the data from the two experimental conditions were 
combined and are reported as such in Table 1. Comparison 
with the control condition revealed that experimental 
participants produced a significantly greater percentage of 
negative triples (mean of 26.9%) than control participants 
(mean of 17.6%), t(119) = 2.30. The homogeneity ratio was 
significantly smaller for experimental participants (mean of 
0.55) than for control participants (mean of 0.66), t(119) = 
2.03. Rule discovery performance as measured in term of 
the triples produced before announcement and number of 
positive and negative triples did not differ significantly 
between the experimental and control conditions.  
The rule discovery profile of participants who discovered 
the correct rule in the Dice and Graph conditions is reported 
in Table 2. The performance of these participants was 
statistically indistinguishable and as a result the data from 
both conditions were combined. Successful participants in 
the control condition tested, on average, 11.6 triples before 
announcing the correct rule whereas experimental 
participants tested 7.7 triples on average before announcing 
the correct rule, a significant difference, t(48) = 3.22. 
Control participants also tested significantly more triples 
that receive positive feedback than experimental participants 
(respective means of 8.5 vs. 5.4), t(48) = 3.25. The rule 
discovery profile of successful participants in the 
experimental and control conditions did not differ 
significantly in terms of negative triples tested, proportion 
of negative triples tested, and homogeneity ratio.  
Discussion 
In the study reported here the external component of a 
distributed representation of Wason’s 2-4-6 inductive 
inference task was enriched in two different ways. In the 
Dice condition, the dimensions of the triple space were 
presented as three 8-sided dice that afforded physical 
manipulation. In the Graph condition, the simple linear 
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N Mean s.e. Mean s.e. Mean s.e. Mean s.e. Mean s.e.
Dice 16 7.75 0.75 5.50 0.72 2.25 0.23 30.55% 3.27% 0.47 0.06
Graph 15 7.73 1.02 5.33 0.64 2.40 0.50 29.87% 3.67% 0.46 0.06
COMBINED 31 7.74 0.61 5.42 0.48 2.32 0.26 30.22% 2.41% 0.47 0.04
CONTROL 19 11.58 1.14 8.53 0.94 3.05 0.48 26.61% 3.36% 0.42 0.06
Homogeneity RatioPercent NegativeTriples Positive Triples Negative Triples
TABLE 2: Rule discovery performance by participants who announced the correct rule in the Dice  and 
Graph condition (separate and combined) and in the control condition in terms of mean number of trials before 
announcements, mean number of triples that received positive and negative feedback, mean percentage of triples that 
received negative feedback, and mean homogeneity ratio (s.e. = standard error)
relationship between numbers in each number sequence was 
plotted. It seems likely that these two manipulations 
influenced the triple production process differently, at least 
in the earlier stages of the task. However, the hypothesis-
testing profiles they encouraged were statistically 
indistinguishable on all measured dimensions.  
 In turn, reasoners who engaged in the 1-8 version of the 
traditional 2-4-6 task (the control condition) were less likely 
to discover the rule with a success rate of 31%, compared to 
53% and 50% for the Dice and Graph conditions, 
respectively. Diligence as gauged by the number of triples 
tested was as high in the control condition as in the enriched 
experimental conditions. However, in terms of relative 
composition, the set of triples produced by the control 
participants was more homogeneous (lower percentage of 
negative triples, higher homogeneity ratio), reflecting a less 
creative exploration of the space of triples.  
The impact of a richer external representation was 
particularly noteworthy when the performance profile of 
successful participants was examined. Control participants 
needed to test on average 11.6 triples before announcing the 
correct rule whereas experimental participants needed to test 
on average 7.7 triples. Thus, in the absence of a richer 
external representation, the inferential challenge posed by 
the Wason task was considerably harder to overcome. The 
hard work put in by the successful control participants also 
explain the relatively high mean number of triples tested in 
the control condition overall.  
The results reported here corroborate those of Vallée-
Tourangeau and Krüsi Penney (in press). Across these two 
studies, the success rate in the different experimental 
conditions where the external representation was enriched 
ranged between 46% and 66% in contrast to the success rate 
in control, ‘impoverished’ conditions that ranged between 
19% and 31%. Thus, configuring the external representation 
of either the dimensions of the triple space or of the linear 
relationships among numbers composing a triple, 
significantly improves reasoners’ ability to infer the correct 
rule.  
These results support the notion that a fruitful research 
program may result from the exploration of external or 
contextual determinants of successful rule discovery 
performance. This would represent, in our opinion, a more 
productive shift away from the goal of explaining successful 
rule discovery performance in terms of psychometric 
individual differences as endorsed by Wason (1960) himself 
and others (e.g., Baron, 2000; Vartanian et al., 2003). 
People obviously vary along many a psychometric 
dimension. There is hardly a less contentious fact in the 
history of psychology. Apart from deflecting attention away 
from the importance of external representation in reasoning 
and problem solving, a focus on individual differences 
implicitly endorses the representativeness of the hypothesis-
testing profile recorded with the traditional Wason task. The 
current research programme is predicated, however, on the 
notion that there are no inherent qualities to the Wason 
original procedure that should make it such a privileged 
window onto hypothesis-testing behavior. Such orthodoxy 
in research practice and interpretation results from the very 
narrow conceptual and methodological path trodden by two 
generations of researchers since Wason originally published 
his findings.  
Better understanding of representational factors that 
support sound reasoning informs and shapes pedagogical 
intervention (Lowrie & Kay, 2001), effective information 
dissemination (Kleinmuntz & Schkade, 1993), and the 
design of cognitive artefacts (Norman, 1993). For example, 
Sedlmeier and Gigerenzer (2001) demonstrated how sound 
Bayesian reasoning can be taught and better elicited using a 
graphical interface wherein probabilistic information is 
presented in terms of natural frequencies. In a similar vein, 
we have recently gathered data that illustrate how the 
quality of causal inferences drawn from covariation 
information depends critically on the presentation format of 
that information (Payton & Vallée-Tourangeau, in 
preparation). Uncovering representational effects in 
inductive reasoning tasks alerts researchers, designers, and 
teachers to the possibility of shaping sounder hypothesis-
testing behaviour through an active manipulation of the 
external representation of the task facing reasoners. 
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